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I am most honoured to have the privilege to present the Foreword to
this fascinating and wonderfully varied collection of contributions, concerning
the nature of computation and of its deep connection with the operation of
those basic laws, known or yet unknown, governing the universe in which
we live. Fundamentally deep questions are indeed being grappled with here,
and the fact that we find so many different viewpoints is something to be
expected, since, in truth, we know little about the foundational nature and
origins of these basic laws, despite the immense precision that we so often find
revealed in them. Accordingly, it is not surprising that within the viewpoints
expressed here is some unabashed speculation, occasionally bordering on just
partially justified guesswork, while elsewhere we find a good deal of precise
reasoning, some in the form of rigorous mathematical theorems. Both of
these are as should be, for without some inspired guesswork we cannot have
new ideas as to where look in order to make genuinely new progress, and
without precise mathematical reasoning, no less than in precise observation,
we cannot know when we are right—or, more usually, when we are wrong.
The year of the publication of this book, 2012, is particularly apposite,
in being the centenary year of Alan Turing, whose theoretical analysis of
∗Published in H. Zenil (ed), A Computable Universe: Understanding Computation &
Exploring Nature As Computation, World Scientific, 2012. Footnotes to names are pointers
to the chapters in the volume for which this foreword was written.
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the notion of “computing machine”, together with his wartime work in de-
ciphering Nazi codes, has had a huge impact on the enormous development
of electronic computers, and on the consequent influence that these devices
have had on our lives and on the way that we think about ourselves. This
impact is particularly evident with the application of computer technology
to the implications of known physical laws, whether they be at the basic
foundational level, or at a larger level such as with fluid mechanics or ther-
modynamics where averages over huge numbers of elementary constituent
particles again lead to comparatively simple dynamical equations. I should
here remark that from time to time it has even been suggested that, in some
sense, the “laws” that we appear to find in the way that the world works
are all of this statistical character, and that, at root, there are “no” basic
underlying physical laws (e.g. Wheeler’s “law without law” [43], Sakharov’s
ideas of “induced gravity” [31], etc., and we find this general type of view
expressed also in this volume also1). However, I find it hard to see that such
a viewpoint can have much chance of yielding anything like the enormously
precise non-statistical dynamics [32] and great mathematical sophistication
that we find in so much of 20th century physics. This point aside, we find
that in reasonably favourable circumstances, computer simulations can lead
to hugely impressive imitations of reality, and the resulting visual represen-
tations may be almost indistinguishable from the real thing, a fact that is
frequently made use of in realistic special effects in films, as much as in serious
scientific presentations. When we need precision in particular implications
of such equations, we may run into the difficult issues presented by chaotic
behaviour, whereby the dependence on initial conditions becomes exponen-
tially sensitive. In such cases there is an effective randomness in the evolved
behaviour. Nevertheless, the computational simulations will still lead to out-
comes that would be physically allowable, and in this sense provide results
consistent with the behaviour of reality.
Computational simulations can have great importance in many areas
other than physics, such as with the spread of epidemics, or with economics
(where the mathematical ideas of game theory can play an important role),2
but I shall here be concerned with physical systems, specifically. The impres-
siveness of computational simulations is often most evident when it is simply
17th century Newtonian mechanics that is involved, in its enormously varied
1see Calude.
2Velupillai.
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different manifestations. The implications of Newtonian dynamical laws can
be extensively computed in the modelling of physical systems, even where
there may be huge numbers of constituent particles, such as atoms in a sim-
plified gas, or particle-like ingredients, such as stars in globular clusters or
even in entire galaxies. It may be remarked that computational simulations
are normally done in a time sense where the future behaviour is deduced
from an input which is taken to be in the past. In principle, one could also
perform calculations in the reverse “teleological” direction, because of the
time-reversibility of the basic Newtonian laws.3 However, because of the sec-
ond law of thermodynamics, whereby the entropy (or “randomness”) of a
physical system increases with time in the natural world, such reverse-time
calculations tend to be untrustworthy.
When Newtonian laws are supplemented by the Maxwell-Lorentz equa-
tions, governing the behaviour of electromagnetic fields and their interactions
with charged material particles, then the scope of physical processes that can
be accurately simulated by computational procedures is greatly increased,
such as with phenomena involving the behaviour of visible light, or with de-
vices concerned with microwaves or radio propagation, or in modelling the
vast galactic plasma clouds involving the mixed flows of electrons and protons
in space, which can indeed be computationally simulated with considerable
confidence.
This latter kind of simulation requires that those physical equations be
used, that correctly come from the requirements of special relativity, where
Einstein’s viewpoint concerning the relativity of motion and of the passage
of time are incorporated. Einstein’s special relativity encompassed, encap-
sulated, and superseded the earlier ideas of FitzGerald, Lorentz, Poincare´
and others, but even Einstein’s own viewpoint needed to be reformulated
and made more satisfactory by the radical change of perspective introduced
by Minkowski, who showed how the ideas of special relativity come together
in the natural geometrical framework of 4-dimensional space-time. When it
comes to Einstein’s general relativity, in which Minkowski’s 4-geometry is
fundamentally modified to become curved, in order that gravitational phe-
nomena can be incorporated, we find that simulations of gravitational sys-
tems can be made to even greater precision than was possible with Newtonian
theory. The precision of planetary motions in our Solar System is now at
such a level that Newton’s 17th century theory is no longer sufficient, and
3Beavers.
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Einstein’s 20th century theory is needed. This is true even for the operation
of the global positioning systems that are now in common use, which would
be useless but for the corrections to Newtonian theory that general relativity
provides. Indeed, perhaps the most accurately confirmed theoretical simu-
lations ever performed, namely the tracking of double neutron-star motions,
where not only the standard general-relativistic corrections (perihelion ad-
vance, rotational frame-dragging effects, etc.) to Newtonian orbital motion
need to be taken into account, but also the energy-removing effects of gravi-
tational waves (ripples of space-time curvature) emanating from the system
can be theoretically calculated, and are found to agree with the observed
motions to an unprecedented precision.
The other major revolution in basic physical theory that the 20th century
brought was, of course, quantum mechanics—which needs to be considered
in conjunction with its generalization to quantum field theory, this being
required when the effects of special relativity have to be taken into account
together with quantum principles. It is clear from many of the articles in
this volume, that quantum theory is (rightly) considered to be of fundamen-
tal importance, when it comes to the investigation of the basic underlying
operations of the physical universe and their relation to computation. There
are many reasons for this, an obvious one being that quantum processes
are undoubtedly fundamental to the behaviour of the tiniest-scale ingredi-
ents of our universe, and also to many features of the collective behaviour of
many-particle systems, these having a characteristically quantum-mechanical
nature such as quantum entanglement, superconductivity, Bose-Einstein con-
densation, etc. However, there is another basic feature of quantum mechanics
that may be counted as a reason for regarding this scheme of things as be-
ing more friendly to the notion of computation than was classical mechanics,
namely that there is a basic discreteness that quantum mechanics introduces
into physical theory. It seems that in the early days of the theory, much was
made of this discreteness, with its implied hope of a “granular” nature under-
lying the operation of the physical world. A hope had been expressed[30, 32]
that somehow the domination of physical theory by the ideas of continuity
and differentiability—which go hand-in-hand with the pervasive use of the
real-number system—might have at last been broken, via the introduction
of quantum mechanics. Accordingly, it was hoped that the ideas of discrete-
ness and combinatorics might soon be seen to become the dominant driving
force underlying the operation of our universe, rather than the continuity
and differentiability that classical physics had depended upon for so many
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centuries. A discrete universe is indeed much more in harmony with current
ideas of computation than is a continuous one, and many of the articles in
this volume4 argue powerfully from this perspective, and particularly in the
context of cellular automata5.
The very notion of “computability” that arose from the early 20th century
work of various logicians Go¨del, Church, Kleene and many others, harking
back even to the 19th century ideas of Charles Babbage and Ada Lovelace,6
and which was greatly clarified by Turing’s notion of a computing machine,
and by Post’s closely related ideas, indeed depend on a fundamental discrete-
ness of the basic ingredients. The various very different-looking proposals
for a notion of effective computability that these early 20th century logicians
introduced all turned out to be equivalent to one another, a fact that is cen-
tral to our current viewpoint concerning computation, and which provides us
with the Church–Turing thesis, namely that this precise theoretical notion
of “computability” does indeed encapsulate the idea of what we intuitively
mean by an idealized “mechanical procedure”. We find this issue discussed
at some depth by numerous authors in this volume7. For my own part, I
am happy to accept the Church–Turing thesis, in this original sense of this
phrase, namely that the mathematical notion of computability—as defined
by what can be achieved by Church’s λ-calculus, or equivalently by a Tur-
ing machine—is indeed the appropriate ideal mathematical notion that we
require for our considerations of computability. Whether or not the universe
in which we live operates in accordance with such a notion of computation
is then an issue that we may speculate about, or reason about in one way or
another (see, for example, Refs. [45, 20]).
Nevertheless, I can appreciate that there are other viewpoints on this,
and that some would prefer to define “computation” in terms of what a
physical object can (in principle?) achieve8. To me, however, this begs
the question, and this same question certainly remains, whichever may be
our preference concerning the use of the term “computation”. If we prefer
to use this “physical” definition, then all physical systems “compute” by
definition, and in that case we would simply need a different word for the
(original Church-Turing) mathematical concept of computation, so that the
4Bolognesi, Chaitin, Wolfram, Fredkin, and Zenil.
5Mart´ınez, Margenstern, Sutner, Wiedermann and Zuse.
6DeMol, Sieg, Sutner, Swade and Zuse.
7DeMol, Sieg, Dershowitz, Sutner, Bauer and Cooper.
8Deutsch, Teuscher, Bauer and Cooper.
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profound question raised, concerning the perhaps computable nature of the
laws governing the operation of the universe can be studied, and indeed
questioned. Accordingly, I shall here use the term “computation” in this
mathematical sense, and I address this question of the computational nature
of physical laws in a serious way later.
Returning, now, to the issue of the discreteness that came through the
introduction of standard quantum mechanics, we find that the theory, as we
understand it today, has not developed in this fundamentally discrete direc-
tion that would have fitted in so well with our ideas of computation. The
discreteness that Max Planck revealed, in 1900, in his analysis of black-body
radiation (although not initially stated in this way) was in effect a discrete-
ness of phase space—that high-dimensional mathematical space where each
spatial degree of freedom, in a many-particle system, is accompanied by a
corresponding momentum degree of freedom. This is not a discreteness that
could apply directly to our seemingly continuous perceptions of space and
time. Nonetheless, various contributors to this volume9 have ventured in
that more radical direction, arguing that some kind of discreteness might be
revealed when we try to examine spatial separations of around the Planck
length lP (approximately 10
−35m) and temporal separations of around the
Planck time (approximately 10−43s). These separations are absurdly tiny,
smaller by some 20 orders of magnitude from scales of distance and time
that are relevant to the processes of standard particle physics. Since these
Planck scales are enormously far below anything that modern particle ac-
celerators have been able to explore, it can be reasonably argued that a
granularity in the very structure of space-time occurring at the absurdly tiny
Planck scales would not have been noticed in current experiments. In addi-
tion to this, it has long been argued by some theoreticians, most notably by
the distinguished and highly insightful American physicist John A. Wheeler,
[42] that our understanding of how a quantum-gravity theory ought to op-
erate (according to which the principles of quantum mechanics are imposed
upon Einstein’s general theory of relativity) tells us that we must indeed ex-
pect that at the Planck scales of space-time, something radically new ought
to appear, where the smooth space-time picture that we adopt in classical
physics would have to be abandoned and something quite different should
emerge at this level. Wheeler’s argument—based on principles coming from
conventional ideas of how Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle when applied
9Bolognesi and Lloyd.
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to quantum fields—involves us in having to envisage wild “quantum fluctu-
ations” that would occur at the Planck scale, providing us with a picture
of a seething mess of topological fluctuations. While this picture is not at
all similar to that of a discrete granular space-time, it is at least supportive
of the idea that something very different from a classically smooth manifold
ought to be relevant to Planck-scale physics, and it might turn out that a
discrete picture is really the correct one. This is a matter that I shall need
to return to later in this Foreword.
When it comes to the simulation of conventional quantum systems (not
involving anything of the nature of Planck-scale physics) then, as was the
case with classical systems, we find that we need to consider the smooth
solutions of a (partial) differential equation—in this case the Schro¨dinger
equation. Thus, just as with classical dynamics, we cannot directly apply
the Church–Turing notion of computability to the evolution of a quantum
system, and it seems that we are driven to look for simulations that are mere
approximations to the exact continuous evolution of Schro¨dinger’s wave func-
tion. Turing himself was careful to address this kind of issue, [39] whether it
be in the classical or quantum context, and he argued, in effect, that discrete
approximations when they are not good enough for some particular purpose
can always be improved upon while still remaining discrete. It is indeed
one of the key advantages of digital as opposed to analogue representations,
that an exponential increase in the accuracy of a digital simulation can be
achieved simply by incorporating additional digits. Of course, the simulation
could take much longer to run when more digits are included in the approx-
imation, but the issue here is what can in principle be achieved by a digital
simulation rather than what is practical. In theory, so the argument goes,
the discrete approximations can always be increased in accuracy, so that the
computational simulations of physical dynamical process can be as precise
as would be desired.
Personally, I am not fully convinced by this type of argument, particularly
when chaotic systems are being simulated. If we are merely asking for our
simulations to represent plausible outcomes, consistent with all the relevant
physical equations, for the behaviour of some physical system under consid-
eration, then chaotic behaviour may well not be a problem, since we would
merely be interested in our simulation being realistic, not that it produces
the actual outcome that will in fact come about. On the other hand, if—as in
weather prediction—it is indeed required that our simulation emphis to pro-
vide the actual outcome of the behaviour of some specific system occurring
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in the world that we actually inhabit, then this is another matter altogether,
and approximations may not be sufficient, so that chaotic behaviour becomes
a genuinely problematic issue.10
It may be noted, however, that the Schro¨dinger equation, being linear,
does not, strictly speaking, have chaotic solutions. Nevertheless, there is a
notion known as “quantum chaos”, which normally refers to quantum sys-
tems that are the quantizations of chaotic classical systems. Here the issue
of “quantum chaos” is a subtle one, and is all tied up with the question of
what we normally wish to use the Schro¨dinger equation for, which has to do
with the fraught issue of quantum measurement. What we find in practice,
in a general way—and I shall need to return to this issue later—is that the
evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation does not provide us with the unique
outcome that we find to have occurred in the actual world, but with a super-
position of possible alternative outcomes, with a probability value assigned
to each. The situation is, in effect, no better than with chaotic systems, and
again our computational simulations cannot be used to predict the actual dy-
namical outcome of a particular physical system. As with chaotic systems,
all that our simulations give us will be alternative outcomes that are plausi-
ble ones—with probability values attached—and will not normally give us a
clear prediction of the future behaviour of a particular physical system. In
fact, the quantum situation is in a sense “worse” than with classical chaotic
systems, since here the lack of predictiveness does not result from limitations
on the accuracy of the computational simulations that can be carried out,
but we find that even a completely precise simulation of the required solution
of the Schro¨dinger equation would not enable us to predict with confidence
what the actual outcome would be. The unique history that emerges, in the
universe we actually experience, is but one member of the superposition that
the evolution of the Schro¨dinger equation provides us with.11
Even this “precise simulation” is problematic to some considerable de-
gree. We again have the issue of discrete approximation to a fundamentally
10Matters relevant to this issue are to be found in [44, 12, 46].
11The question may be raised that the seeming randomness that arises in chaotic classical
dynamics might be the result of a deeper quantum-level actual randomness. However, this
cannot be the full story, since quantum randomness also occurs with quantized classical
systems that are not chaotic. Nevertheless, one may well speculate that in the non-linear
modifications of quantum mechanics that I shall be later arguing for, such a connection
between chaotic behaviour and the probabilistic aspects of present-day quantum theory
could well be of relevance.
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continuous mathematical model of reality. But with quantum systems there
is also an additional problem confronting precise simulation, namely the vast
size of the parameter space that is needed for the Schro¨dinger equation of a
many-particle quantum system. This comes about because of the quantum
entanglements referred to earlier. Every possible entanglement between indi-
vidual particles of the system requires a separate complex-number parameter,
so we require a parameter space that is exponentially large, in terms of the
number of particles, and this rapidly becomes unmanageable if we are to
keep track of everything that is going on. It may well be that the future
development of quantum computers would find its main application in the
simulation of quantum systems. We find in this collection, some discussion of
the potential of quantum computers, though there no consensus is provided
as to the likely future of this interesting area of developing technology.12
We see that despite the discreteness that has been introduced into physics
via quantum mechanics, our present theories still require us to operate with
real-number (or complex-number) functions rather than discrete ones. There
are, however, proposals (e.g. [4]) in which the notion of “computation” is
taken in a sense in which it applies directly to real-number operations, the
real numbers that are employed in the physical theory being treated as real
numbers, rather than, say, rational approximations to real numbers (such as
finitely terminated binary or decimal approximations). In this way, simula-
tions of physical processes can be carried out without resorting to approx-
imations. This, however, can require that the initial data for a simulation
be given as explicitly known functions, and that may not be realistic. More-
over, there are various different concepts of computability with real num-
bers, [41, 5, 33, 4, 28] which, unlike in the situation that arose for discrete
(integer-valued) variables, where the Church-Turing concept appears to have
provided a single generally accepted universal notion of “computation”, there
are many different proposals for real-number computability and no such gen-
erally accepted single version appears to be in evidence. Moreover, we unfor-
tunately find that, according to a reasonable-looking notion of real-number
computability, the action of the ordinary second-order wave operator turns
out to be non-computable in certain circumstances (see e.g. Refs. [28, 29]).
Whatever the ultimate verdict on real-number computability might be, it
appears not to have settled down to something unambiguous as yet.
There is also the question of whether an exact theory of real-number
12Schmidhuber, Lloyd, Zurowski.
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computability would have genuine relevance to how we model the physical
world. Since our measurements of reality always contain some room for
error—whether this be in a limit to the precision of a measurement or in
a probability that a discrete parameter might take one or another value (as
sometimes is the case with quantum mechanics)—it is unclear to me how such
an exact theory of real-number computability might hold advantages over
our present-day (Church–Turing) discrete-computational ideas. Although
the present volume does not enter into a discussion of these matters, I do
indeed believe that there are significant questions of importance here that
should not be left aside (for example, see [29, 20, 41, 5]).
Several articles in this volume address the issue of whether, in some sense,
the universe actually is a computer.13 To me, this seems to be a somewhat
strange idea. Although I can more-or-less understand what it might mean for
it to be possible to have (theoretically) a computational simulation of all the
actions of the physical universe,14 which involves some sort of “constructivist”
assumption15 for the operation of the physical world, I find it much less clear
what it might mean for the universe to be a computer. Various images come
to mind, maybe suggested by how one chooses to picture a modern electronic
computer in operation. Our picture might perhaps consist of a number of
spatially separated “nodes” connected to one another by a system of “wires”,
where signals of some sort travel along the wires, and some clear-cut rules
operate at the nodes, concerning what output is to arise for each possible
input. There also needs to be some kind of direct access to an effectively
unlimited storage area (this being an essential part of the Turing-machine
aspirations of such a computer-like model). However, such a discrete picture
and a fixed computer geometry does not very much resemble the standard
present-day models that we have of the small-scale activity of the universe
we inhabit. The discreteness of this picture is perhaps a little closer to some
of the tentative proposals for a discrete physical universe, such as the “causal
sets”16 that I shall briefly return to later, which represent some attempts at
radical ideas for what space-time might be “like” at the Planck scale.
Yet, there are some partial resemblances between such a computer-like
picture and our (very well supported) present-day physical theories. These
theories involve individual constituents, referred to as “quantum particles”,
13Lloyd, Deutsch, Turner and Zuse.
14Bolognesi and Szudzik.
15Bauer.
16Bolognesi.
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where each would have a classical-level description as being spatially “point-
like”—though persisting in time, providing a classical space-time picture of
a 1-dimensional “world-line”. If these world-lines are to be thought of as the
“wires” in the above computer-inspired picture, then the “nodes” could be
thought of as the interaction places (or intersection points) between different
particle world-lines. This would be not altogether unlike the computer image
described above, though in standard theory, the topological geometry of the
connections of nodes and wires would be part of the dynamics, and not fixed
beforehand. Perhaps the lack of a fixed geometry of the connections would
provide a picture more like the amorphous type of computer structure also
considered in this volume,17 than a conventional computer. However, it is
still not clear how the “direct access to an effectively potentially unlimited
storage area” is to be represented. More seriously, this is merely the classical
picture that is conjured up by our descriptions of small-scale particle activity,
where the quantum “picture” would consist (more or less) of a superposition
of all these classical pictures, each weighted by a complex number. Such a
“picture” perhaps gets a little closer to the way that a quantum computer18
might be represented, but again there are the crucial issues raised by the
topology of the connections being part of the dynamics and the absence of
an “unlimited storage area”, in the physical picture, which seem to me to rep-
resent fundamental differences between our universe picture and a quantum
computer. In addition to all this, there is again the matter of how one treats
the continuum in a computational way, which in quantum (field) theory is
more properly the complex rather than the real continuum. Over-riding all
this is the matter of how one actually gets information out of a quantum
system. This requires an analysis of the measurement problem that I shall
need to come to shortly.
I think that, all this notwithstanding, when people refer to the universe
“being” a computer, the image that they have is not nearly so specific as
anything like that suggested above. More likely, for our “computer universe”
they might simply have in mind that not only can the universe’s actions
be precisely simulated in all its aspects, but that it has no other functional
quality to it, distinct from this computational behaviour. More specifically,
for our “computer universe” there would be likely to be some parameter t
(presumably a discrete one, which could be regarded as taking integer values)
17Hewitt, Teuscher, Margenstern and Wiedermann.
18Schmidhuber, Margenstern, Zurowski.
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which is to describe the passage of time (not a very relativistic notion!),
and the state of the universe at any one time (i.e. t-value) would have
some computational description, and so could be completely encoded by a
single natural number St. It would be the universe’s job to compute St′
from St whenever t
′ > t, and the universe would be considered to be a
computer provided that not only is it able always to achieve this, but—more
importantly—that this is the sole function of the universe. It seems to me
if, on the other hand, the universe has any additional function, such as to
assign a reality to any aspect of this description, then it would not simply be a
computer, but it would be something more than this, succeeding in providing
us with some kind of ontology that goes beyond the mere computational
description.
To conclude this Foreword, I wish to present something that is much more
in line with my own views as to the relation between computation and the
nature of physical reality. To begin with, I should perhaps point out that
my views have evolved considerably over the decades, but without much in
the way of abrupt changes. Early on I had been of a fairly firm persuasion
that there should be a discrete or combinatorial basis to physics, perhaps
somewhat along the lines expressed in some of the articles19 in this volume. In
1967 Erwin Kronheimer and I published a paper [14, 18] on the kind of causal
sets referred to earlier in this Foreword, where the basic relationships between
the elements are those of causality20, mirroring the causal relations between
events in continuous space-time, but where no continuity or smoothness is
assumed, and where one could even envisage situations of this kind where
the total number of these elements is finite.
Although I also had different reasons to be interested in spaces with a
structure defined solely by causal relations—partly in view of their role in
relation to singularity theorems [17, 11] (for the study of black holes and
cosmology)—the causality relations not necessarily being tied to the notion
of a smooth space-time manifold, I did not have much of an expectation that
the true small-scale structure of our actual universe should be helpfully de-
scribed in these terms. I had thought it much more probable that a different
combinatorial idea, that I had been playing with a good deal earlier, namely
that of spin-networks (see Ref. [19]) might have true relevance to the basis
of physics (and indeed, much later, a version of spin-network theory was to
19Bolognesi, Schmidhuber, Lloyd, Wolfram, Zuse, Fredkin and Zenil.
20Bolognesi.
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form part of the loop-variable approach to quantum gravity, [1] although the
role that spin-networks acquire in loop-variable gravity is somewhat different
from what I had originally envisaged).
Spin-network theory was based on one of the most striking parts of stan-
dard quantum mechanics, where a fundamental notion that is continuous in
classical mechanics, is discrete in quantum mechanics, namely angular mo-
mentum (or spin). In fact, many of the most basic and counter-intuitive fea-
tures of quantum mechanics, such as discreteness and (Bell) non-locality,21
are most powerfully expressed in terms of quantum-mechanical spin. The
puzzling relation between the continuous array of possibilities for the direc-
tion of a spin axis in our classical space-time pictures and the discrete (or
“granular”) nature of the quantum idea of “spin-axis direction” had always
maintained a fundamental fascination for me. This and the basic non-locality
of information in quantum mechanics come together in spin-network theory,
where the classical idea of a spatial “direction” does not arise in a well-
defined way until very large spin-network structures are present in order
provide a good approximation to the continuous sphere of possible spatial
directions. Specific mathematical devices for calculating the often extremely
complicated expressions were developed, but everything remains completely
discrete, and computational in the conventional sense of the word, continuity
arising only in the limit of large numbers. The need to generalize the idea of
spin-networks in order that the geometry of 4-dimensional space-time might
be described, rather than just the sphere of spatial directions, finally found
some satisfaction in the ideas of twistor theory (see Refs. [18, 23], Chap-
ter 33). This provided a different way of looking at space-time geometry
from what is usual—but now the idea of discreteness underlying the basis
of physics began to fade, and became superseded by the magic of complex
geometry and analysis.
One normally thinks of the space-time 4-manifold as being composed of
“events” (i.e. space-time points), which are the basic elements of the ge-
ometry. Instead, twistor theory takes its basic elements to be modelled on
entire histories of massless spinning particles in free flight. By a careful com-
bination of ideas from space-time 4-geometry and the quantum-mechanical
structure of relativistic angular momentum for massless particles, the concept
of “twistor algebra” was developed. [18, 19] In special relativity, the basic
concept of a twistor, which describes the kinematical structure of a spinning
21Breuer, Cabello, Schmidhuber and Zenil.
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massless particle, finds its mathematical description as an element of the
complex 4-vector space T referred to as “twistor space”. The geometry of T
relates to the real geometry of Minkowski 4-space M by means of an explicit
geometrical correspondence, relating M directly to the complex 3-geometry
of the projective twistor space PT. It turns out that the complex numbers of
quantum mechanics dovetail with those of the complex geometry of twistor
theory in surprising ways, and that there is an intriguing interplay between
the non-locality that naturally arises in the twistor description of quantum
wavefunctions and the non-locality that we actually find in quantum phe-
nomena. [24] In recent years, twistor theory has found considerable value in
the calculation of high-energy scattering processes, where the rest-masses of
the particles involved can be ignored, (See, for example, Ref. [2]) but many
of the deeper issues confronting twistor theory remain unresolved.
It has always been an aim of twistor theory (still only partially fulfilled)
that it should form a vehicle for the natural unification of quantum mechan-
ics with general relativity. By this, I do not mean “quantum gravity” in
the conventional sense in which this term is used. What is usually meant
by quantum gravity is some scheme in which the ideas of Einstein’s theory
of gravity—namely general relativity (or else perhaps some modification of
Einstein’s theory)—is brought under the umbrella of quantum field theory.
This viewpoint is to take the laws of quantum field theory as being invio-
late, and that the ideas of general relativity must yield to those of quantum
theory via some appropriate form of “quantization”. My own view has al-
ways been different from this, as I believe that quantum theory itself, quite
apart from its need to be unified with general relativity theory, is basically
self-inconsistent and that some help is needed from outside the normal rules
of quantum (field) theory. The view here is that the underlying principles of
general relativity should help to supply this outside assistance.
This inconsistency is a very fundamental one, and is in a clear sense com-
pletely obvious (the “elephant in the room”!) as we shall see. As remarked
upon earlier, we take the evolution of a quantum system in isolation to be
governed by the Schro¨dinger equation—or, in more general terms, unitary
evolution—and for which I use the symbol “U”. But, as was remarked upon
earlier, the reality of the world that we actually observe taking place about
us tends not to be described directly by the solution Ψ of this equation that
we get by this U-evolution, but when an observation or “measurement” is
deemed to have taken place, Ψ is considered to “jump” to just one member
Ψr of a family of superposed alternative solutions
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Ψ = α1Ψ1 + α2Ψ2 + . . .+ αnΨn (1)
where the respective squared moduli of the complex-number weightings
α1, α2, . . . , αn, supply the respective probabilities of each Ψr being the result
(the quantities Ψr being assumed to be all normalized and mutually orthog-
onal). The “evolution process” whereby Ψ is replaced by the particular Ψr
that happens to come about is the reduction of the state (collapse of the
wavefunction) and I denote this process by the letter “R”.22
Of course, there will be many such decompositions, for a given Ψ, depend-
ing on the choice of basis that is supposed to be determined by the choice
of “measuring device”. Indeed, we must allow that this measuring device
is also part of the entire system under consideration, and so should have a
quantum state that becomes entangled with the quantum system under ex-
amination. Nevertheless there is still taken to be a “jump” in the system as
a whole as soon as the measurement is considered to have been made, where
the different “pointer states” of the device are entangled with the different
possible Ψrs that can result. It is obvious that this “jumping” from the state
of the system (consisting of both the measuring device and system under ex-
amination, together with the entire relevant surrounding environment), from
before measurement to after measurement, is normally not even continuous,
let alone a solution of the Schro¨dinger equation: so R blatantly violates U
(in almost all circumstances).
Why do physicists not normally consider this to be a contradiction in
quantum mechanics? There are many responses, usually involving some sub-
tle issue of “interpretation”, according to which physicists try to circumvent
this (seeming?) contradiction. Here is where the “many-worlds” viewpoint
of Hugh Everett III is often invoked, [8, 6] whereby it is considered that all
alternative outcomes simply(!) co-exist in quantum superposition, and that
it is perhaps somehow a feature of our conscious perception processes that we
always perceive only one of these alternatives. Despite this idea’s popularity
among many philosophically minded physicists (or physically well-educated
philosophers), I find this viewpoint very unsatisfactory. I would agree that
it is indeed where we are led, if we regard the U-process as inviolate, but to
me this is to be taken as a reductio ad absurdum and a clear indication that
we need to seek an improvement in current quantum mechanics. To put this
22In Von Neumann’s classic book Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics
[16], he introduced “R” and “U” under the respective names “process I” and “process II”.
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another way, even if the many-worlds viewpoint is in some sense “correct”,
it is still inadequate as a description of the physical world, for the simple
reason that it does not, as it stands, describe the world that we actually ob-
serve, in which we find that something extremely well approximated by the
R-process actually takes place when quantum superpositions of states that
are sufficiently different from one another are involved.
What do I mean by “sufficiently different”? It is clear that mere phys-
ical distance apart, for the different material displacements involved in the
superposed states, is not the correct criterion, because there have been well-
confirmed experiments in which photon states tens of kilometres apart still
maintain their quantum entanglements with one another, so that their var-
ious possible different polarization states remain in quantum superposition
with each other even over such distances.[35] However, there are reasons
to expect, from various foundational principles of Einstein’s general theory
of relativity, (see [7, 21, 25]) that when mass displacements between two
quantum-superposed states get large, then such superpositions become un-
stable and ought to decay, in a roughly calculable time τ , into one or the
other, so that classical behaviour begins to take over from quantum be-
haviour. The estimate of τ is given by the formula
τ ≈
~
EG
(2)
where EG is the gravitational self-energy of the difference between the
mass distributions in each of two quantum states under consideration, each
being assumed to constitute a stationary state if on its own. Such a decay
would represent a deviation from the standard linearity of U and might per-
haps even be the result of some kind of chaotic behaviour arising in some
non-linear generalization of present-day quantum mechanics. There are ex-
periments currently under development that are aimed at testing this pro-
posal, and we may perhaps anticipate results over the next several years
(see Ref [15]).
For various reasons, partly concerned with the quantum non-locality re-
ferred to earlier (which only begins to present substantial problems for quan-
tum realism when R is involved, treated as a real phenomenon), I would
expect this change in current quantum mechanics to represent a major rev-
olution and would not be at all easy to arrive at simply by “tinkering” with
the Schro¨dinger equation. Indeed, my expectations are that such a theory
would have to be non-computable in some very subtle way. Why am I mak-
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ing such an assertion? The main reasons are rather convoluted, and I quite
understand why some people regard my proposals as somewhat fanciful. Nev-
ertheless, I am of the view that there is a good foundational rationale for a
belief that something along these lines may actually be true!
The basic reason comes from Go¨del’s famous incompleteness theorems,
which I regard as providing a strong case for human understanding being
something essentially non-computable. The central argument is a familiar
one, and I still find it difficult to comprehend why so many people are un-
willing to take on board what would seem to be its fairly clear implication
in this regard. In simple terms, the argument can be applied to our abilities
to demonstrate the truth of certain mathematical propositions—which we
can take to be of the form of Π1-sentences. A Π1-sentence is an assertion
that some proposed Turing computation never terminates (examples being
Wiles’s “Fermat’s last theorem” and Lagrange’s theorem that every natural
number is the sum of four squares). We might try to encapsulate, within
some algorithmic procedure A, all possible types of argument that can, in
principle, be used to establish Π1-sentences, according to human insight and
understanding. This argument might be a proof within some given formal
system F, where A would be an algorithm for checking whether a proposed
proof using the rules of F had been correctly carried out, giving the answer
YES after a finite number of steps if this is indeed the case. What the
Go¨del(–Turing) theorem shows, in this context, is that if we have trust in A
(and therefore in the soundness of such an F, with regard to Π1-sentences)
that a “proved” Π1-sentence is indeed true whenever A asserts YES, then
one can explicitly exhibit a Π1-sentence G where our trust in A extends also
to a trust in the truth of G, even though A itself is shown to be incapable
of directly establishing G. In the case of Go¨del’s second incompleteness the-
orem, the Π1-sentence G(= G(F)) would be an assertion of the consistency
of F, and G would be the Π1-assertion that among the theorems of F, there
would be none whose negation is also a theorem of F. Although our trust
tells us that A would be unable to establish G (i.e. the consistency of F), our
trust that G is actually true follows from our trust in A (which depends on
F’s consistency—otherwise F would be able to establish 2 = 3, a conclusion
which we certainly would not trust). Our trust in the use of F as a means of
establishing the truth of Π1-sentences therefore carries us beyond the direct
capabilities of F, and enables us to assert that G(F) is true, on the basis of
that same trust, despite the fact that F does not contain G(F) among its
theorems.
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This is basically the thrust of Go¨del’s attack on formalism. Although the
formalization of various areas of mathematics certainly has its value, allowing
us to the transfer different aspects of human understanding and insight into
computational procedures, Go¨del shows us that these explicit procedures,
once known—and trusted—cannot cover everything in mathematics that is
accessible to understanding and insight.23 And, indeed, this applies already
for the relatively limited area of Π1-sentences. Yet, a case can certainly be
argued that this does not yet provide a demonstration that human insight
is, at root, a non-algorithmic procedure, and I list here what appear to be
the main arguments in support of that case, i.e. of criticisms of the above
claim that the Go¨del-type arguments show that human understanding is
non-computational,
1. Errors argument—human mathematicians make errors, so rigorous
Go¨del-type arguments do not apply.
2. Extreme complication argument—the algorithms governing human
mathematical understanding are so vastly complicated that their Go¨del
statements are completely beyond reach.
3. Ignorance of the algorithm argument—we do not know the algorith-
mic process underlying our mathematical understanding, so we cannot
construct its Go¨del statement.
I have tried to argue elsewhere [20] that (1), (2), and (3) do not invalidate
the conclusion that our conscious understandings are very unlikely to be
entirely the product of computational actions, and it is not my purpose to
repeat such detailed arguments here. Nevertheless I briefly summarise my
counter-arguments, in what follows.
The main point, with regard to (1) is that human errors are correctable.
We are not so much concerned with the often erroneous gropings that math-
ematicians employ in their search for truth, but more the ideals that they
grope for and, more importantly, measure their achievements against. It is
their ability to perceive these ideals that we are concerned with, if only in
principle, and it is this ability to perceive ideal mathematical truth that we
are concerned with here, not the errors that we all make from time to time. (It
may be evident from these comments that I do regard mathematical truth—
especially with regard to matters so straight-forward as Π1-sentences—as
23Zizzi.
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something absolute, and external to ourselves. But I appreciate that oth-
ers24 are sometimes less sympathetic to this kind of viewpoint. I do not
believe, however, that one’s philosophical standpoint in this respect signifi-
cantly affects the arguments that I am putting forward here.) With regard
to (2) the point is somewhat similar. If the algorithms were in principle to
be known, then their size or complication is of no real concern. This applies
to a great many mathematical arguments. In Euclid’s proof of the infinity
of primes, for example, we need to consider primes that are so large that
there would be no way to write them down explicitly in the entire observable
universe, and to calculate the product of them all up to some such size in
practice, is even more out of the question. But all this is irrelevant for the
proof. Similar points apply to (2).
The argument (3) is, however, much more relevant to the discussion,
and was basically Go¨del’s own reservation (referred to in the commentaries
here1) with regard to making the strong conclusion that I am arguing for
here. Rather than pushing the logical argument further, which is certainly
possible to do (see Ref. [20]). I shall here merely indicate the extraordinary
improbability of the needed algorithmic action arising in our heads, by the
process of natural selection. Such an algorithm would have to have extraor-
dinary sophistication, so as to be able to encapsulate, in its effective “formal
system” many steps of “Go¨delization”. As an example, I have pointed out
elsewhere [22] that whereas Goodstein’s theorem, [9] whose meaning2 is easily
accessible even to those with little mathematical knowledge other than basic
numerical notation, has been shown by Kirby and Paris [13] to be inacces-
sible by first-order Peano arithmetic (without a “Go¨delization” step, that
is), yet this theorem can be readily seen to be true through mathematical
understanding. If our mathematical understanding is achieved by some (un-
knowable, but sound) algorithmic procedure, it would be a total mystery how
it could have arisen through natural selection, when the experiences of our
remote ancestors could have gained no benefit whatsoever from having such
a sophisticated yet totally irrelevant algorithm planted in their brains!
If, then, it is accepted that our understanding of mathematics is not an
algorithmic process, we must ask the question what kind of process can it
be? A key issue, it seems to me, is that genuine understanding (at least in
24DeMol.
1Sieg.
2Velupillai.
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our normal sense of this word) is something that requires awareness—as it
would seem to me to be a misuse of the word “understanding” if it could be
genuinely applied to an entity that had no actual awareness of the matter
under its consideration. Awareness is the passive form of consciousness, so it
seems to me that it was the evolutionary development of consciousness that
is the key, and that such a quality could certainly have come about through
natural selection, being able to confer an enormous selective advantage on
those creatures possessing it. In saying this, I am expressing the view that
consciousness is indeed functional and is not an “epiphenomenon” that sim-
ply happens to accompany certain kinds of cognitive processes. This view is
certainly an implication of the quality of “understanding” requiring conscious
awareness, since understanding is certainly functional.
I should make clear that I am making no claim to know—or to be able
to define—what consciousness actually is, but its role in underlying “under-
standing” (whatever that is) seems to me to be of great evolutionary value,
and could readily arise as a product of natural selection. I should also make
clear that I am regarding the consciousness issue as a scientific one, and
that I do not take the view that these are matters that are inaccessible to
scientific investigation. I also take it that healthy wakeful human brains (as
well as whatever other kind of animal brains may turn out also to be simi-
larly capable) are able, somehow, to evoke consciousness by the application
of those very same physical laws that are present throughout the universe,
even though consciousness itself comes about only in the very special cir-
cumstances of organization that are needed to promote its appearance.
What kind of circumstance could that be, if we are asking for some sort
of non-computable action to come about—when we bear in mind that the
deterministic differential equations of classical or quantum physics seem to
be of an essentially computable nature? My response to this query is that
the non-computability must lie in hitherto undiscovered laws that could be
of relevance here. (I am ignoring the issue, referred to earlier, of the discrete
computational simulation of a continuous evolution. Yet, I do accept that
there might be some questions of genuine relevance here that ought to be fol-
lowed up more fully.) As far as I can see, the only big unknown, in physical
laws, that could have genuine relevance here, is the U/R puzzle of quantum
mechanics, referred to above. In almost all processes that take place, we have
no need of the presumed New Theory that is to go beyond current quantum
mechanics, mainly because its effects would go un-noticed, being swamped
by the multifarious random influences of environmental decoherence. But, in
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the brain, there might be relevant structures able to preserve quantum co-
herence up to a length of time at which the previously mentioned τ ≈ ~/EG
criterion actually becomes relevant. Then, the normal purely probabilistic
action that standard quantum theory’s R-process provides us with is to be
replaced by some subtle non-computational decision as to which choice the
state reduction leads to. With a sophisticated brain organization, where the
synaptic responses are sensitive to these choices, we can imagine that the out-
put of the brain could indeed be usefully non-computational. This, indeed,
is the basis of the “orchestrated objective reduction” (Orch-OR) scheme
that Stuart Hameroff and I have proposed some years ago, where the above
“relevant structures” would be neuronal microtubules of the appropriate type
(see Refs. [10, 21, 27]).
It is hardly surprising that such a proposal has met with some consid-
erable scepticism, mainly for the very understandable reason that to have
body-temperature quantum coherence at anything like the level required is
enormously far beyond the expectations of standard physical calculations ap-
plied to simplified models of cells. [34] Nevertheless, biological cells are, in
fact, highly sophisticated structures,3 and one may reasonably expect that,
when the structures of certain cell parts are dedicated in the appropriate
directions, their behaviour might exhibit quite unusual quantum-mechanical
properties.4 In fact, recent experiments carried out in Japan by Anirban
Bandyopadhyay [3] and his co-workers appear to have demonstrated that
highly intriguing quantum-coherent effects do actually take place in body-
temperature neuronal microtubules. These results are, as of now, prelimi-
nary, but they do appear to provide some encouragement for the Orch-OR
scheme, and it will be very interesting to see how things develop.
Even if all of this is accepted, we may still ask what would be the use of
a little bit of non-computable action, from time to time, for the operation of
the brain? Indeed, there would not be much value in this unless the quantum
coherence is of a very global character, involving large areas of the brain, and
the process would have to act in some globally coherent way. This is indeed
the Orch-OR picture, and we take it that moments of consciousness occur
when state reduction occurs at many sites (in microtubules) at once in an
orchestrated way, so that the synapse strengths are influenced in many places
and a concerted influence results, as would be expected for conscious actions.
3Margenstern, Ehrenfeucht et al., Rozenberg and Zenil.
4Zizzi.
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The results of particular acts of conscious understanding would be unlikely
to be usually anything simple, and would depend upon the experience of
memories as well as on logic. But the non-computable ingredient is taken
to be essential, for the reasons described above. According to this view, our
conscious actions are calling upon parts of physics—encompassed in a New
Theory that is presently unknown in detail. The impact of this theory on
processes not organized in this way would not be evident. But it would
make its mark on systems—such as wakeful healthy human brains—where it
emerges as conscious actions and perceptions. The non-computable effects
of this New Theory would emerge in this way and result in actions that are
described as “hypercomputational”.
How far outside the normal scheme of computational physics would these
hypercomputational actions be? Since the Go¨delian insight that allows us to
transcend a given trusted formal system F provides this insight in the form
of a Π1-sentence, namely G(F), we might expect that we could model such
hypercomputational actions in the form of a Turing oracle-machine,5 where
the oracle is able to assert the truth or falsity of Π1-sentence. However this
would not be sufficient (nor does it appear to be necessary), as we can apply
a Go¨del-type “diagonalization” insight again on Π1-sentence-oracle machines
to transcend these devices also. In a recent article, [26] I consider a type of
oracle that I refer to as a “cautious oracle”, which is intended to model a
little more closely the kind of thing that one might consider idealized human
mathematicians might be capable of, where the cautious oracle can examine a
Πn-sentence (for any natural number n) and either respond “true” or “false”
(necessarily truthfully in each case), or else confess to being unable to supply
an answer or, failing any of these, simply continue pondering indefinitely
without ever providing an answer at all. Again a Go¨del-type diagonalization
allows us the insight to transcend any such a device’s capabilities! Whatever
kind of hypercomputational capabilities such a “New Theory” might confer,
it appears to be something very subtle. It is some sort of never-ending
capability of being able to “stand back” and contemplate whatever structure
had been considered previously. This seems to be a quality that consciousness
is able to achieve, but how one incorporates this kind of thing into a physical
theory is hard to imagine, as our present-day theories stand.
5Chaitin, Dershowitz.
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